![]() And so the person who has the power to do this and is a truly a man would never make even a single agreement not to do injustice nor suffer it he would be mad. Justice is in the middle of these both, endorsed not as something good but as worthwhile, due to the inability to commit injustice. “This is the origin and nature of justice, midway between what’s best-to do injustice without repaying with justice-and the worst-to be done injustice without the power to avenge it. And that’s when they begin to make their laws and contracts between one another, and they name what is commanded bylaw “lawful” and “just”.” “They say that committing injustice is by nature good, while suffering it is bad, but the greater evil of suffering it outstrips the benefit of doing it, so that when they commit and suffer injustice at each other’s hands, and have experienced both, to those who are unable to escape the one and choose the other it seems profitable to promise one another to neither commit injustice or suffer it. “And so listen to what I said would be first, what justice is and where it comes from.” “What else is there that an intelligent person would appreciate talking and hearing about more often?” That’s why I will speak positively, step by step, about the unjust life, showing you the way I want to hear you disparage injustice and praise justice. I want to hear it celebrated just by itself, and I think I will hear that from you most of all. I haven’t quite heard from anyone concerning the account of justice, that it is better than injustice, to my satisfaction. “It doesn’t seem this way to me at all, Socrates, but my ears have been drenched by listening to Thrasymachos and countless others and I am at a loss. I will revive Thrasymachos’ argument, first, by describing what kind of thing people say justice is and where it comes from, and second, how everyone who practices it does so unwilling, as a necessity rather than as a good, and, third, how they do so reasonably, since the life of the unjust man is far better than the life of the just man, or so they say.” “So this is what I will do, if it seems okay to you. For me, the presentation on each of them was somewhat unsatisfactory and I still want to hear what each of them is and what effect each of them has, just by itself, on the soul, putting aside the wages and the things that come from them.” For Thrasymachos appears to me to have been soothed by you, like a snake, earlier than he should. “Come then,” he said, “listen to me and see if it still seems so to you. ![]() ![]() “I know it’s thought of this way,” I said, “and Thrasymachos has been finding fault with it on such grounds for a long time, and praising injustice. “That’s not where most people put it,” he said, “but in the laborious class, which must be practiced for the sake of wages and the standing that comes from reputation, but which itself should be avoided because difficult.” “I think,” I said, “into the most fine, the one that is loved, by the person who intends to be blessed, for itself and for what comes from it.” “Into which of these would you put justice?” he said. “There is indeed this third kind,” I said. “And do you see some third kind of good,” he said, “which includes exercise and medical treatment when sick and medical practice and other forms of money-making, since we say these things are laborious and yet beneficial for us, and we don’t want to have them for their own sakes, but for the sake of the wages and various other things that come from them.” “And what about a kind that we love both in its own right and for what comes from it, such as thinking and seeing and being healthy? We welcome such things for both reasons, I suppose.” “I certainly do think there is this kind of good,” I said. “Tell me, do you think there is the following kind of good, which we are pleased to possess not because we desire its consequences, but which we welcome for its own sake, such as pleasant experiences and pleasures that are harmless and give rise to nothing else subsequently besides the pleasure of having them?” “Well you aren’t doing what you want,” he said. “I would prefer truly,” I said, “if it were in my power.” With these words I thought myself released from talking, but it seems it was only a prelude, since Glaukon, who is always most brave about everything, did not accept Thrasymachos’ withdrawal but said, “Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly persuade us, that justice is better than injustice in every respect?”
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |